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Abstract
We consider a renewable resource being exploited in common by firms that compete
both in the output market and in the exploitation of the resource. We show that
the introduction of the slightest cost differentiation among the firms can have a drastic
effect on the nature of the equilibria that may be expected as compared to the identical
cost case. To do this, we take as a benchmark case a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium
that exists with identical cost firms, with the property that the firms play a linear
strategy up to some endogenously determined threshold level of the stock and the static
Cournot equilibrium strategy beyond that threshold. Having shown that an equilibrium
of that nature is not sustainable with asymmetric cost, we fully characterize a Markov
Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the differential game for that case.
Re´sume´
Nous envisageons le cas d’une ressource naturelle renouvelable exploite´e en commun par
des firmes qui se concurrencent a` la fois dans le marche´ du produit et dans l’exploitation
de la ressource. Nous montrons que l’introduction de la moindre diffe´rence de couˆts
entre les firmes peut avoir un effet drastique sur la nature de l’e´quilibre, a` comparer
avec le cas de couˆts identiques. Pour ce faire, nous prenons comme point de re´fe´rence
un e´quilibre de Nash markovien parfait qui existe dans le cas de firmes identiques
et qui a la proprie´te´ que les firmes jouent une strate´gie line´aire jusqu’a` une borne
supe´rieure endoge`ne du stock et la strate´gie correspondant a` l’e´quilibre de Cournot
statique au-dela` de cette borne. Apre`s avoir montre´ qu’un e´quilibre de cette nature
n’est pas soutenable avec des couˆts asyme´triques, nous proposons une caracte´risation
comple`te d’un e´quilibre de Nash markovien parfait au jeu diffe´rentiel correspondant a`
ce cas.
1 Introduction
Studies of the economic dynamics of common pool resource exploitation typically assume
that the economic agents exploiting the resource are all identical. Yet, in many situations,
the heterogeneity of the agents is an inescapable characteristic of the problem. Think for
example of the case of fisheries, where it is common to find a number of big multinational
fishing firms competing with many small local fishermen for the exploitation of a common
fishing ground. These big firms have access to large scale technologies and consequently face
considerably lower marginal costs than the small local fishermen. Similarly, aquifers are often
shared by a few large capacity users — for instance big bottling firms — and many small
capacity users.1 In such cases, it seems important to take into account the heterogeneity of
the agents in order to properly characterize the non-cooperative equilibria. It is the purpose
of this paper to introduce some form of heterogeneity into a common pool resource model
and to analyze the impact of this heterogeneity on the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic
game being played by the agents. The emphasis is put on how the slightest heterogeneity
can have a drastic effect on the type of equilibria that can be expected, as compared to the
homogeneous agents case.
More precisely, we consider the exploitation of a renewable resource stock by a finite
number of two types of agents: a low marginal cost type, which we will call the “big firms”
for short, and a high marginal cost type, which we will call the “small firms”. The total
number of firms, which we will assume fixed, will thus be divided into two groups of firms,
identical within groups but different across groups. The situation will be modeled as an
oligopolistic differential game in which the two groups of firms have access to the same
renewable natural resource pool, which they exploit in common. They then sell their harvest
on the same output market. They are therefore competing both in the output market and
in the exploitation of the common pool resource. We restrict attention to non-cooperative
equilibria in stationary Markov strategies, that is decision rules that are contingent only on
1The prevalence of asymmetries is well illustrated in Ostrom and Gardner (1993). Their purpose and
approach are however quite different from ours; they are interested in the emergence through bargaining of
institutions to manage the commons in the face of heterogeneous agents.
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the current state of the game. In our context, those decision rules specify the firm’s resource
extraction rate as a function of the current stock of the resource.
A number of authors have analyzed the problem of the exploitation of a common pool
resource in a differential game framework. Amongst them, Levhari and Mirman (1980),
Clemhout and Wan (1985), Plourde and Yeung (1989), Fischer and Mirman (1992, 1996),
Dockner and Sorger (1996), Dockner et al. (2000), Gaudet and Lohoues (2008), consider
cases where the agents involved compete for the exploitation of the resource, but do not
compete on the output market. In those papers, the benefit functions of the agents depend
only on their own production, not on that of their rivals. In this paper, the agents compete
in the output market as well as in the exploitation of the resource, as in Benchekroun (2003,
2008), Karp (1992) and Mason and Polasky (1997). As in this paper, those authors assume
benefit functions that depend not only on the agents’ own production, but also, through
the output market, on the production of their rivals. However, they assume identical agents
when comes the time to derive equilibrium strategies. We will allow for heterogeneous agents.
Our model is closely related to the identical-agents model of Benchekroun (2003, 2008),
which we take as a point of comparison to illustrate equilibrium impacts of heterogeneity.
As in Benchekroun (2003, 2008), we consider a renewable natural resource characterized by
a concave growth function which is approximated by two linear segments, and we assume
that all the firms sell the product of their harvest on the same output market, characterized
by a downward sloping linear demand function. Benchekroun (2003) assumes two identi-
cal players exploiting the resource at zero marginal cost and focuses on the effects on the
equilibrium resource stock of a unilateral restriction of the exploitation of one firm and the
corresponding adjustment in the rival’s exploitation. Benchekroun (2008) assumes a finite
number of firms and determines the impact of a change in the implicit growth rate of the
resource on firms’ extraction and profits. We assume a finite number of firms split into
two groups and differentiated by their marginal costs. We focus on the effects of the cost
asymmetry on the individual equilibrium strategies and the aggregate harvest rate.
In Benchekroun (2003), it is shown that there exists a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium
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(MPNE) with the following characteristics: below some initial threshold level of the resource
stock, the resource is not harvested at all, hence allowing the resource to grow; follows an
interval of the stock, up to some second threshold, over which each firm’s harvesting decision
is a linear and increasing function of the resource stock; beyond that last threshold, each
firm’s harvest rate is a constant that corresponds to the static Cournot equilibrium.
We will see that cost asymmetry has a drastic effect on this type of equilibrium: there
cannot exist, as in Benchekroun (2003, 2008), a MPNE with the characteristic that linear
strategies are played over some interval, followed by the firms playing the static Cournot
equilibrium. This leads us to conclude that if there exits a MPNE which is such that beyond
some high enough level of the stock the Cournot static equilibrium is to be played, it must
be the case that non linear strategies are played in the preceding stock interval.
However, there does exist a MPNE where linear strategies are played over some interval
of the stock, with the upper bound of the interval being maintained by an impulse control
on the part of the high marginal cost firms. This means that stocks higher than this upper
bound will not be sustainable in this equilibrium. Such an equilibrium also differs from the
identical firms equilibrium of Benchekroun (2003) by the fact that the interval characterized
by linear strategies is preceded by two subintervals: one where no harvesting takes place and
one where only the low marginal cost firms produce. There may of course also exist other
MPNE such that linear strategies are played over some interval of the stock, while higher
stock levels remain sustainable.
In the next section, we present the model. We then characterize a MPNE in Section 3,
while emphasizing how the presence of cost asymmetries rules an equilibrium of the same
nature as that found in the benchmark case of identical firms. Section 4 offers concluding
remarks.
2 The model
Consider a natural resource that is commonly owned and exploited by n firms divided into
two groups: a group of nb “big” firms and a group of ns “small” firms, with ns + nb = n.
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They are identical within a group but differ between groups by their (constant) marginal
costs. The representative member from a given group i, i = s, b, has a marginal cost wi. We
will assume that
Assumption 1: ws > wb.
Hence the big firms have a cost advantage over the small firms, which bear a greater marginal
cost.
Denote by x(t) the stock of the resource at time t and by qk(t) the rate of harvest of a
given firm k, k = 1, . . . , n. The inverse demand function for the output is
P (Q) = a− bQ, (1)
where a and b are two positive constants. We assume that a− wi > 0, i = s, b.
As in Benchekroun (2003), we assume that the natural growth function of the resource
takes the form
g(x) =
 δx for x ≤ k/2δ (k − x) for x > k/2 (2)
where δ and k are positive parameters reflecting the characteristics of the ecosystem. The
parameter δ represents the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, while the parameter k
represents the carrying capacity of the ecosystem.
We assume that the intrinsic growth rate of the resource satisfies
Assumption 2: (i) δ >
(n2 + 1) r
2
and (ii) δ ≥ 2(n
2 + 1)(a− wb)
(n+ 1)2bk
,
where r is the discount rate, assumed the same for all the firms. The assumption in (i) that
δ/r is strictly bounded from below serves to guarantee the existence of a strictly interior
equilibrium steady-state stock. It is common in the literature (see for instance Benchekroun
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(2003), Dockner and Sorger (1996) or Dutta and Sundaram (1993a,b)). As for the assumption
in (ii), it is made to simplify the exposition, as will be explained shortly (on page 8). 2
We restrict attention to equilibria in stationary Markov strategies. Stationary Markov
strategies in this context are decision rules that specify a firm’s harvest rate as a function
of the current resource stock: qk(t) = φk(x(t)). Firm k, k = 1, . . . , n, takes the strategies of
its (n− 1) rivals as given in choosing its own decision rule, qk = φk(x) in order to maximize
the present value of its flow of instantaneous profits:
Jk =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{[
P
(
qk +
∑
l 6=k
φl(x)
)
− wk
]
qk
}
dt (3)
subject to
x˙ = g(x)− qk −
∑
l 6=k
φl(x) (4)
and
qk ≥ 0, lim
t→∞
x(t) ≥ 0. (5)
We are looking for a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE). An n-tuple of stationary
Markov strategies (φ1 (x) , ..., φn (x)) constitutes a MPNE of this dynamic game if, for every
possible initial condition x(0) = x0, it simultaneously solves the above problem for k =
1, 2, ..., n. Since we have two groups of firms and firms are identical within each group, it
suffices to find a pair of Markov strategies (φs (x) , φb (x)) which gives an n-tuple composed
of ns decision rules φs (x) and nb decision rules φb (x) that satisfies this property.
In the next section, we characterize a MPNE for this non-cooperative differential game.
2Clearly, if the right-hand side of (ii) is greater than the right-hand side of (i), then satisfying (ii) satisfies
(i); and vice-versa.
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3 Characterization of an equilibrium
The Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellmann equation (HJB) associated with the problem of firm k, k =
1, . . . , n, is
rVk (x) = Max
qk
{(
a− wk − b
(
qk +
∑
l 6=k
φl(x)
))
qk + V
′
k (x)
(
g(x)− qk −
∑
l 6=k
φl(x)
)}
.
(6)
The interior solution to the right-hand side must satisfy3
a− wk − 2bqk − b
∑
l 6=k
φl(x)− V ′k(x) = 0. (7)
Using the symmetry among firms that belong to the same group, we seek to determine a
MPNE where firms that belong to the same group have identical strategies. Thus we have
(ni + 1) qi + njqj =
a− wi − V ′i (x)
b
, i, j = b, s, i 6= j. (8)
The solution of this system of two equations in qs and qb expressed in terms of the value
functions is given by
qi =
a− wi − V ′i (x)− nj
[
(wi + V
′
i (x))− (wj + V ′j (x))
]
b (n+ 1)
, i, j = b, s, i 6= j, (9)
and the total quantity harvested as a function of the value functions can therefore be written
Q = (nsqs + nbqb) =
na− nsws − nbwb − nsV ′s (x)− nbV ′b (x)
b (n+ 1)
. (10)
The following proposition describes such a MPNE when not all the firms are of the same
type.
3Notice that the right-hand side of the HJB, which is to be maximized with respect to qk, is strictly
concave in qk, its second derivative being −2b.
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Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 1 and 2 and strictly positive levels of the stock x¯b <
x1s < x2s, to be defined, then, for any ni ∈ {1, .., n− 1}, there exists a MPNE characterized
by strategies φi (x), i = s, b which satisfy the following properties:
1. over the interval [0, x¯b), no firm produces;
2. over the interval [x¯b, x1s), only the big firms produce;
3. over the interval [x1s, x2s], both types of firms produce using linear strategies;
4. a stock larger than x2s is not sustainable.
The proof is by construction. We begin by characterizing a MPNE over the subinterval
[x1s, x2s]. To do this, let
A = −(n+ 1)
2 b
n2
(
δ − r
2
)
< 0 (11)
and
Bi =
(
δ − r
2
)
n2δ
[(
n2 + 1
)
(a− wi) + nj
(
2δ − (n2 + 1) r
n (δ − r)
)
(wi − wj)
]
(12)
where i, j = s, b, i 6= j, and define
x1i = − 1
A
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2δ
)[
a− wi + nj
(
(2 + n) δ − r
n (δ − r)
)
(wi − wj)
]
(13)
and
x2i = −Bi
A
. (14)
Note that since A > 0 and Bb > Bs > 0 (from Assumption 1 and Assumption 2(i)), we have
x1s > 0 and x1b < x1s < x2s < x2b.
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Furthermore, from Assumption 2(ii) we have
x2b ≤ k
2
.
Since x2b > x2s, this will assure that the interval [x1s, x2s] lies in the increasing part of the
growth function g(x).4
We can now prove that the following proposition holds over the interval [x1s, x2s]:
Proposition 2 Let φi (x), i = s, b, denote the linear harvesting strategies
φi(x) =

fs(x) ≡ α(x− x1s), for i = s
fb(x) ≡ α(x− x1s) +
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2b(δ − r)
)
(ws − wb), for i = b,
(15)
defined over the interval [x1s, x2s] and where
α =
−A
b(n+ 1)
=
n+ 1
n2
(
δ − r
2
)
, (16)
and x1s and x2s are given respectively by (13) and (14). The n-uple (φs, ..., φs, φb..., φb)
composed of ns strategies φs (x) and nb strategies φb (x) constitutes a MPNE for the game
described in (3) to (5) for x ∈ [x1s, x2s].
Proof. See Appendix A.
As shown in Appendix A, the value function that generates the above equilibrium in
linear strategies over the interval [x1s, x2s] is quadratic and given by
Vi(x) =
A
2
x2 +Bix+ Ci (17)
4This avoids having to calculate different linear strategies for the subintervals [x1s, k/2] and (k/2, x2s],
without significant loss in insight.
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where the coefficients A and Bi are given by (11) and (12), and Ci is as expressed in the
Appendix. Since A is negative, we have V ′′i (x) < 0 for i = s, b. We can see that
qs(x1s) = fs(x1s) = 0 and V
′
s (x2s) = 0, (18)
while
qb(x1s) = fb(x1s) > 0 and V
′
b (x2s) > 0, (19)
since x2b > x2s and V
′′
b (x) < 0.
The aggregate harvesting rate over the interval [x1s, x2s] is Q(x) = nsfs(x) +nbfb(x). By
Assumption 2(i), we have
Q′(x) = nα > δ = g′(x) ∀x ∈ [x1s, x2s].
Therefore, there exists a unique steady-state resource stock in the interval [x1s, x2s] and it is
stable. It is given by
x∗ =
(
1
nα− δ
){
nαx1s − nb
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2b(δ − r)
)
(ws − wb)
}
. (20)
We now consider the characterization of equilibrium strategies for x ∈ [0, x1s). For x in
that interval, we will have a corner solution for the ns small firms, since qs(x1s) = 0. Thus
only big firms may be active and the problem reduces to finding the equilibrium strategy of
the nb big firms over that interval.
Proposition 3 Let φi (x), i = s, b, denote the strategies
φs(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, x1s)
9
and
φb(x) =
 0 for x ∈ [0, x¯b)h(x) for x ∈ [x¯b, x1s)
where h(x) is a continuous monotone increasing function of x, to be defined, which satisfies
h(x¯b) = 0 and is such that Vb(x) is continuously differentiable at x1s and x¯b. The n-uple
(φs, ..., φs, φb..., φb) composed of ns strategies φs (x) and nb strategies φb (x) constitutes a
MPNE for the game described in (3) to (5) for x ∈ [0, x1s).
Proof. Since the right-hand side of the HJBs (6), which is to be maximized with respect
to qk, is strictly concave in qk, and since qs(x1s) = 0, it follows that we have a corner solution
for the small firms for all x ∈ [0, x1s). Therefore φs(x) = 0 over the interval being considered,
as stated in the proposition.
There remains to determine an equilibrium strategy for the big firms. This will involve
finding a x¯b such that φb(x¯b) = 0, with Vb(x) continuously differentiable in the neighborhood
of x1s. Given that qs(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x1s), and using the symmetry of the firms within
the group, an interior solution to the right-hand of the HJB (6) of the typical firm of type b
requires
a− wb − (nb + 1) bφb(x)− V ′b (x) = 0.
It follows that
φb(x) =
a− wb − V ′b (x)
(nb + 1) b
. (21)
Substituting into the HJB gives
rVb (x) =
(
a− wb − n2bV ′b (x)
nb + 1
)(
a− wb − V ′b (x)
(nb + 1) b
)
+ δV ′b (x)x. (22)
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The requirement that φb(x¯b) = 0 means that
V ′b (x¯b) = a− wb.
The solution to such a differential equation can be characterized implicitly. Letting
p = V ′b (x), we have
dp
dx
= V ′′b (x). Then, differentiating the differential equation (22) with
respect to x gives
(r − δ) pdx
dp
− δx =
(
2n2b
(nb + 1)2b
)
p− (a− wb)(n
2
b + 1)
(nb + 1)2b
The general solution to this first-order differential equation in x is
x (p) = C1p
−δ
δ−r −
(
2n2b
(2δ − r)b(nb + 1)2
)
p+
(
(a− wb)(n2b + 1)
δb(nb + 1)2
)
where C1 is the arbitrary constant. In order to guarantee that Vb(x) is continuously differ-
entiable at x1s this constant is chosen such that at x = x1s we have p = limx→x+1s V
′
b (x). In
other words, C1 is determined implicitly by
x
(
V ′b (x1s)
+
)
= x1s,
where V ′b (x1s)
+ = limx→x+1s V
′
b (x) is obtained from the solution over the interval [x1s, x2s]
given by Proposition 2.
As for the value of x¯b, it must satisfy V
′
b (x¯b) = a − wb, and hence p = a − wb. It is
therefore given implicitly by
x (a− wb) = x¯b.
Once the value of x¯b determined we obtain V (x¯b) from (22) and the value function Vb (x)
over [0, x¯b). It can be checked that value function Vb (x) is continuously differentiable in the
neighborhood of x¯b. That the harvesting rate of the big firms is a continuous monotone
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increasing function of x for x ∈ [x¯b, x1s) follows directly from (21), since we have x′(p) < 0
and hence dp
dx
= V ′′b (x) < 0. Furthermore, since x
′′(p) > 0, it is a strictly convex function of
x.
From (17), we have that the value function from which the solution in linear strategies
over the interval [x1s, x2s] was obtained is, for the firms of type b,
Vb (x) ≡ A
2
x2 +Bbx+ Cb
and therefore
V ′b (x1s)
+ = Ax1s +Bb.
Substituting for A, Bb and x1s, we find that
V ′b (x1s)
+ = a− wb + b(nb + 1)fb(x1s),
where, from Proposition 2,
fb(x1s) =
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2b(δ − r)
)
(ws − wb).
This is the production of the typical big firm when x = x1s under the equilibrium linear
strategies for the interval [x1s, x2s]. The left-hand and right-hand derivatives of Vb(x) at
x = x1s must be equal to assure the requirement that it be continuously differentiable.
Therefore, substituting the value of V ′b (x1s)
+ into (21) we can see that the harvesting rate
of the big firms is continuous at x1s, with no jump occurring.
There remains to consider x > x2s. For that purpose, we can state the following:
Proposition 4 Conditional on the linear strategies described in Proposition 2 being adopted
over the interval [x1s, x2s], there exists a candidate for equilibrium which is such that, if
x > x2s, the small firms bring down the resource stock to x2s by impulse control, with the
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result that a stock greater than x2s is not sustainable.
Proof. First note that
qSCi =
a− (ni + 1)wi + njwj
b(n+ 1)
, i, j = b, s, i 6= j
are the equilibrium quantities which would be produced in an equivalent static Cournot game,
where the input (the resource being harvested) is considered abundant. The corresponding
total quantity is
QSC =
na− nsws − nbwb
b(n+ 1)
. (23)
Making use of (18) and (19), we get from (9) and (10)
qb (x2s) = q
SC
b −
(ns + 1)V
′
b (x2s)
(n+ 1) b
< qSCb (24)
qs (x2s) = q
SC
s +
nbV
′
b (x2s)
(n+ 1) b
> qSCs (25)
and
Q(x2s) = Q
SC − nbV
′
b (x2s)
b (n+ 1)
< QSC . (26)
Notice that if nb = 0, so that n = ns, then qs(x2s) = q
SC
s and Q(x2s) = Q
SC . We
then have the identical-firms situation analyzed in Benchekroun (2003), where, for x ≥ x2s,
the firms play the static Cournot equilibrium forever, reaching a stable steady state in the
decreasing part of the growth function.5
When the firms are not identical, if the initial stock were sufficiently large, namely some
x ≥ QSC/δ, and if QSC < δk/2 (≡ maxx g(x)), the firms could still play the static Cournot
equilibrium forever, since the stock would then converge to a stable steady state along the
5The same is also true if instead ns = 0 so that qb(x2b) = q
SC
b and Q(x2b) = Q
SC . In Benchekroun (2003)
ws = wb = 0, so that the distinction is irrelevant.
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downward sloping part of the growth function, as in the identical-firm context. The static
Cournot equilibrium still qualifies as a potential MPNE for x > x2s. Each firm’s discounted
sum of payoffs would then be
piSCk
r
≡ [a− wk − bQ
SC)]qSCk
r
for k = b, s
with QSC and qSCk and given by (23), (24) and (25).
For the small firms, this payoff is smaller than what they can earn if the stock is at x2s
with the firms playing the equilibrium in linear strategies of the interval [x1s, x2s]. The small
firms would then each be producing more than in the static Cournot equilibrium, while total
production would be smaller and hence the market price higher. Indeed, using the fact that
V ′s (x2s) = 0, we get from (6) that the HJB for the typical small firm evaluated at x2s is
rVs(x2s) = [a− ws − bQ(x2s)]qs(x2s) ≡ pis.
From (25) and (26) we have pis > pi
SC
s and hence
Vs(x2s) =
pis
r
>
piSCs
r
. (27)
Therefore, for any x > x2s, given that the big firms play their static Cournot strategy, it is
in the small firms’ interest to instantaneously reduce the stock to x2s, through an impulse
control, so as to have the firms play the equilibrium in linear strategies of Proposition 2
instead of the static Cournot equilibrium. As for the big firms, given that the small firms
adopt a harvest rate that maintains x2s, playing their static Cournot output for any x > x2s
leaves them no worst off. Hence, neither type of firms has an incentive to unilaterally deviate.
As a result, a stock greater than x2s is not sustainable in this MPNE.
Notice that the small firms would not allow the stock to grow beyond x2s even in the
case where the big firms continue to follow their linear strategy defined in Proposition 2 for
[x1s, x2s], since V
′
s (x2s) = 0 and V
′′
s (x) < 0 for x > x2s, which means that following the
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equilibrium in linear strategy for x > x2s implies for the small firms a smaller payoff than
Vs (x2s).
Notice also that if the small firms adopt a strategy for x > x2s that prescribes an impulse
control that instantly brings the stock to x2s, then the big firms’ extraction for x > x2s is
not payoff relevant. In particular, their best response over (x2s,∞) to that strategy by the
small firms could include a continuation of their linear strategy defined in Proposition 2 for
[x1s, x2s], as well as playing the static Cournot quantity.
If the initial stock is sufficiently large but QSC > δk/2, then the static Cournot equilib-
rium cannot be played forever, since the stock would be decreasing. In that case, the stock
would reach x2s in finite time; again x > x2s is not sustainable.
Since the firms will be playing the linear strategies of Proposition 2 for x ∈ [x1s, x2s], the
stock will converge to the stable steady state x∗ given by (20).
Notice that the result of Proposition 4 is conditional on the equilibrium in linear strategies
being played over the interval [x1s, x2s]. This means that, contrary to the identical-firms case
of Benchekroun (2003), playing the static Cournot equilibrium for x > xs is not sustainable
in the presence of the slightest cost-differentiation among firms, if the equilibrium in linear
strategies is played over the interval [x1s, x2s]. It follows that if there exists a MPNE with
the property that the static Cournot equilibrium is played forever beyond some level of the
stock, then it must be the case that this is preceded by an interval over which non-linear
strategies are played. Such an equilibrium should also have the property that both types
of firms would reach a maximum of their respective value function at the level of stock at
which the static Cournot strategies set in. This is not the case of the equilibrium in linear
strategies over [x1s, x2s] posited in Proposition 4, since V
′
b (x2s) > 0.
Taking for granted that the linear strategies of Proposition 2 are played over the interval
[x1s, x2s], there may well exist other types of equilibria for which x > x2s is sustainable. To
see this, let x˜ denote a steady state in the decreasing part of the growth function which can
be supported by a MPNE for x > x2s. Let W (x) denote the corresponding value function,
with V (x) representing the quadratic value function (17) over the interval [x1s, x2s], and let
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p(x) = a− bQ(x). Then we can write
pis(x2s)− pis(x˜) = [p(x2s)− ws]qs(x2s)− [p(x˜)− ws]qs(x˜)
= [p(x2s)− ws][qs(x2s)− qs(x˜)] + b[Q(x˜)−Q(x2s)]qs(x˜)
From (9) and (10) and the fact that V ′s (x2s) = 0, we know that
qs(x2s)− qs(x˜) = nbV
′
b (x2s)
(n+ 1)b
− nsW
′
s(x˜) + nbW
′
b(x˜)
(n+ 1)b
+
W ′s(x˜)
b
(28)
and
Q(x˜)−Q(x2s) = nbV
′
b (x2s)
(n+ 1)b
− nsW
′
s(x˜) + nbW
′
b(x˜)
(n+ 1)b
, (29)
where it can be assumed that W ′i ≥ 0, i = s, b, for, if W ′i < 0, firms of type i could increase
their profits by destroying some of the stock. Substituting in the above yields
pis(x2s)− pis(x˜) = [p(x2s)− ws]W
′
s(x˜)
b
+ [p(x2s)− ws + bqs(x˜)][Q(x˜)−Q(x2s)]. (30)
We can see that the sign of pis(x2s)−pis(x˜) depends crucially on the sign of Q(x˜)−Q(x2s).
If Q(x˜) − Q(x2s) ≥ 0, then pis(x2s) − pis(x˜) > 0, in which case there will be an impulse
control by firms s to maintain x2s. The static Cournot falls in this category, since it implies
W ′i (x˜) = 0, and hence Q(x˜) − Q(x2s) > 0. However, we cannot exclude the existence of
equilibria for which pis(x2s)−pis(x˜) < 0. If such equilibria exist we would necessarily observe
that Q(x˜)−Q(x2s) < 0 and there would be no incentive to maintain x2s.
Remark: It is interesting to note that we have Vs(x2s) =
pis
r
> pi
SC
s
r
.and qs (x2s) > q
SC
s (see
27 and 25 in the proof of Proposition 4). The small firms can earn a larger payoff than they
woull earn in an equivalent static Cournot game where the input is considered abundant
(i.e., in the absence of renewability constraint).
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4 Conclusion
Asymmetries among economic agents exploiting in common stocks of natural resources are
very frequently encountered. In spite of that fact, they are practically ignored in the lit-
erature on the economics of common pool resources. A reason for this is arguably that
dealing with asymmetries considerably increases the difficulties of characterizing the equi-
libria, particularly in the context of a dynamic oligopolistic game. An important conclusion
to be drawn from this paper is that it would be a mistake to assume that the nature of
the equilibria found in the symmetric situation can be replicated in an asymmetric context.
At the very least, great caution should be exercised, since an equilibrium that holds in the
symmetric case may not be robust to the introduction of the slightest heterogeneity among
the agents.
Indeed, we have shown that the introduction of cost heterogeneity among agents can
have a drastic effect on the nature of equilibrium that can be supported, as compared to
the homogeneous agents case. The benchmark case was taken to be one in which a common
pool of a renewable resource is harvested by identical agents and where a MPNE exists
with the following properties: below some initial threshold level of the resource stock, the
resource is not harvested at all, hence allowing the resource to grow; follows an interval
of the stock, up to some second threshold, over which each agents’s harvesting decision
is a linear and increasing function of the resource stock; beyond that last threshold, each
agents’s harvest rate is a constant that corresponds to the static Cournot equilibrium. It
was shown here that if the agents are instead divided between low and high marginal costs
ones, keeping other things the same, playing the static Cournot strategies beyond some
endogenously determined interval of the stock over which linear strategies are played is not
sustainable as an equilibrium. The reason for this is that for stock levels greater than the
upper bound of the interval over which the linear strategies are played, the agents with the
higher marginal cost can earn a larger payoff by bringing back the stock to that upper bound
via an impulse control; hence stock levels greater than that upper bound are not sustainable
in this equilibrium. We do show that acting in this way constitutes a MPNE, which we fully
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characterize. An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that the high cost agents can earn
a larger payoff than they would earn in an equivalent static Cournot game with unlimited
renewability of the resource as an input.
It can of course not be ruled out that other MPNE exist such that linear strategies
are played over some interval of the stock, while higher stock levels remain sustainable.
Showing their existence and characterizing such equilibria remains a challenging task for
future research. One thing is clear however: if there exists a MPNE in the asymmetric case
analyzed here such that static Cournot strategies are played beyond some stock threshold,
it must be the case that in the interval preceding that threshold non-linear strategies have
been played, in sharp contrast with the symmetric case.
18
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
We need to solve the problem of firm k, k = 1, . . . , n, as stated in (3) to (5). This will
determine its best response, over the interval [x1s, x2s], to the strategies φi(x) of the n − 1
other firms resulting from the MPNE proposed in Proposition 2.
Substituting for qs and qb from (9) into the HJB (6) of each type of firm, we obtain the
following non-linear system of differential equations in (Vb (S) , Vs (S)):
rVk (x) = (a− wk − b (nsqs + nbqb)) qk + V ′k (x) (δx− (nsqs + nbqb)) , k = b, s
where qs and qb are given by (9). Recall that, by Assumption 2(ii), the interval [x1s, x2s] lies
in the increasing part of the growth function, for which g(x) = δx.
Given the linear-quadratic structure of the game over the interval being considered, we
search for quadratic value functions of the form
Vk =
Ak
2
x2 +Bkx+ Ck, k = b, s
where Ak, Bk and Ck are parameters to be determined.
If we rewrite the HJBs using this form of the value function we get, for i, j = s, b, i 6= j,
{
b (n+ 1)2Ai
(
δ − r
2
)
+ (niAi + njAj)
2
}
x2
+
{
b (n+ 1)2Bi (δ − r)− Ai
[(
n2 + 1 + 2nj
)
(a− wi) + 2ninj (wi − wj)
]
+ 2njAj [(a− wi)− nj (wi − wj)] + 2 (niAi + njAj) (niBi + njBj)
}
x
+ [(a− wi)− nj (wi − wj)]2 −Bi
[(
n2 + 1 + 2nj
)
(a− wi) + 2ninj (wi − wj)
]
+ 2njBj [(a− wi)− nj (wi − wj)] + (niBi + njBj)2 − (n+ 1)2 brCi
= 0
19
Since this second degree polynomial must hold for all x ∈ [x1s, x2s], all its coefficients must
be set to zero. Doing so gives us a solution for the unknowns Ai, Bi and Ci, namely
Ai = Aj = A = −(n+ 1)
2b
n2
(
δ − r
2
)
Bi =
(
δ − r
2
)
n2δ
[(
n2 + 1
)
(a− wi) + nj (wi − wj) [2δ − (n
2 + 1) r]
n (δ − r)
]
and
Ci =
1
(n+ 1)2 br
{
[(a− wi)− nj (wi − wj)]2 + (niBi + njBj)2
− (a− wi)
[(
n2 + 1
)
Bi + 2nj (Bi −Bj)
]− 2nj (wi − wj) (niBi + njBj)}
Taking into account the fact that we must have As = Ab = A, write
Vi (x) ≡ A
2
x2 +Bix+ Ci, i = b, s.
and define
fi (x) ≡ 1
b (n+ 1)
[−Ax+ (a− wi −Bi)− nj (wi − wj +Bi −Bj)] , i, j = b, s, i 6= j.
The stock levels x1i are those for which fi(x) = 0, that is
x1i =
1
−A [Bi − (a− wi) + nj (Bi −Bj + wi − wj)]
=
1
−A
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2δ
)[
a− wi + nj
(
(2 + n) δ − r
n (δ − r)
)
(wi − wj)
]
.
We may therefore write
fi (x) ≡ −A
b (n+ 1)
[x− x1i] = α (x− x1i) ,
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and
fb (x)− fs (x) = A
b (n+ 1)
[x1b − x1s]
=
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2b(δ − r)
)
(ws − wb).
It immediately follows that
fs(x) = α (x− x1s)
and
fb(x) = α (x− x1s) +
(
2δ − (n2 + 1)r
2n2b(δ − r)
)
(ws − wb),
as stated in the proposition.
The stock level x2s, which defines the upper bound of the interval considered, is the one
that maximizes Vs(x) and hence given by V
′
s (x2s) = 0, or
x2s = −Bs
A
.
We can similarly determine the stock level x2b as that which satisfies V
′
b (x2b) = 0, that
is x2b = −Bb/A. It lies outside the interval [x1s, x2s], since x2b > x2s, as does x1b, since
x1b < x1s.
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